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Essay 
What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need 
During a Financial Crisis? 
Eric A. Posner† 
During the financial crisis of 2007–08, the government 
sought to use aggressive measures to unfreeze the credit mar-
kets, but it found itself repeatedly blocked by the law. Officials 
reacted to their legal problems in different ways. During the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve (Fed) refused 
to issue an emergency loan because of legal hurdles. However, 
in the cases of Bear Stearns and AIG, the Fed violated the law, 
or interpreted it in an extremely narrow way, rather than re-
fraining from the emergency actions that events called for. The 
Fed and the Department of the Treasury relied on additional 
questionable legal interpretations for the numerous credit facil-
ities that they established, and in the bailouts of Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, General Motors, and Chrysler. In many cases, the 
agencies evaded the law by engaging in elaborate legal maneu-
vers that obfuscated their actions. When the Fed and Treasury 
sought additional legal authority from Congress, Congress ini-
tially refused, causing one of the most dangerous moments dur-
ing the crisis. 
At the same time, the mainstream view is that most of the 
government’s actions were good policy. They put an end to a 
massive liquidity crisis—the worst since the Great Depression, 
possibly the worst in U.S. history—and spared the country an 
even more severe downturn than the Great Recession of 2007–
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09. Moreover, the failure to rescue Lehman—law or no law—
was the Fed’s biggest mistake: the collapse of Lehman intro-
duced the most acute phase of the financial crisis, which until 
that point seemed manageable. The mismatch between law and 
policy raises numerous questions. Should the law be updated to 
permit the policy interventions that the government felt it 
needed to use? If so, how exactly should the law be changed? 
It is possible to argue that the law makes little difference. 
The agencies and their leaders did not pay a price for their le-
gal violations during the crisis; next time around, they may dis-
regard the law again.1 But it is clearly better if the Fed acts 
lawfully than if it acts illegally. The legal restrictions were not 
costless. They caused the Fed to act more cautiously than it 
should have, and they have allowed officials to blame their fail-
ure to rescue Lehman in September 2008 on legal constraints, 
thereby deflecting criticism of their judgment. The law also 
forced the Fed and Treasury to structure straightforward 
transactions—loans and asset purchases—in complex ways, 
which reduced transparency, increased cost, and produced un-
intended consequences. The law was also responsible for the 
division of authority between different agencies—the Fed, 
Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and others—and 
their disagreements during the crisis led to delay and coordina-
tion failures. Finally, the government’s legal violations have 
generated expensive and time-consuming litigation, which may 
ultimately force the government to pay tens of billions of dol-
lars to shareholders.2 
In this Essay, I describe how the law needs to be updated 
in order to provide government agencies with the legal authori-
ty they need to resolve a financial crisis. I begin in Part I with a 
description of the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) function. It has 
been understood since the nineteenth century that central 
 
 1. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 50 (2010) (discussing Congress’s inability 
and unwillingness to curb the power of the Fed and Treasury in the wake of 
the financial crisis); cf. PHILIP A. WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITI-
MACY, AND THE RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 160, 175–76 (2015) 
(arguing that the Fed’s major constraint was that of maintaining legitimacy 
rather than legality, though the two were related). 
 2. See generally David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 1405 (2014) (discussing lawsuits brought by the government against fi-
nancial institutions, as well as possible legal exposure of the government). 
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banks must intervene during a financial crisis by making 
emergency loans to financial institutions, and possibly the 
broader market as well. This understanding was embodied in 
law in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which authorizes the 
Fed to make emergency loans during a financial crisis.3 
However, the statute, while broadly worded, contains a 
number of restrictions that would impede the response to the 
financial crisis in 2007–09. Moreover, the complex regulatory 
regime gave certain crisis-related authorities to institutions 
other than the Fed, including FDIC, the SEC, and Treasury. 
Meanwhile, the financial system has changed enormously from 
1913 to today, with many of the crucial changes taking place 
only over the last twenty years, in ways that were not ade-
quately understood, even by experts, until the financial crisis 
exposed the fissures that those changes created.4 The Fed’s fo-
cus has always been on the banking system, whose traditional 
function was to convert short-term lending into long-term lend-
ing. That function was partially taken over by the “shadow 
banking” system toward the end of the twentieth century—
which consists of investment banks, insurance companies, and 
other non-bank financial institutions. It was in the shadow 
banking system that the financial crisis originated, and the 
mismatch between the law and the response to the crisis re-
flected in part the law’s focus on the banking system. 
Part II summarizes the consequences of the mismatch. As 
the crisis unfolded, policymakers realized that they needed to 
engage in numerous actions that did not fall comfortably within 
the confines of the law. The law authorized secured loans,5 but 
the crisis required the government to issue loans that could not 
be fully secured; to buy assets; and to acquire equity.6 Underly-
ing the law was a crucial principle, which guided the Fed’s con-
duct: the Fed should not engage in “fiscal” activities. This 
means that the Fed should make loans only when it is confi-
dent it could be repaid; it should not enter transactions that 
 
 3. Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 263 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (2012)). 
 4. For a discussion on the rise of “shadow banking,” see GARY B. 
GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM 
COMING 125–33 (2012). 
 5. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). This section of the Federal Reserve Act has 
since been amended. See infra Part III.C. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
  
1532 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1529 
 
could cause a loss borne by taxpayers. As I will argue, this 
principle, as well as the law itself, significantly hampered the 
Fed’s response. 
Part III draws out implications for the law and for admin-
istrative structure. I argue that the LLR needs more powers 
than it currently has—including the power to make unsecured 
loans and buy assets, including equity; to take predictable loss-
es; to seize control of financial institutions; and to regulate 
market transactions. I also argue that the LLR function should 
be centralized in a single, independent agency—most plausibly, 
the Fed itself. The LLR needs maximal power over the financial 
system because of the inherent unpredictability of crises. The 
next crisis will not look like the last one; the LLR needs to be 
able to do more than fight the last war. Unfortunately, in the 
Dodd-Frank Act,7 Congress moved in the opposite direction, 
weakening rather than strengthening the LLR. 
A number of commentators argue that the financial crisis 
was caused by government meddling and was exacerbated by 
the market’s belief that the government would bail out firms 
that failed.8 These commentators argue that the Fed’s LLR 
function should be restricted or eliminated.9 While I disagree 
with this view, it is not my purpose to criticize it. Instead, my 
goal is to assume that the mainstream view is correct that the 
Fed acted properly during the financial crisis by lending wide-
ly, and to examine what reforms are necessary to supply it with 
the proper legal authority. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE LLR   
A. LIQUIDITY CRISES 
The principles governing the LLR were famously articulat-
ed by the British journalist Walter Bagehot in his book, Lom-
bard Street, published in 1873.10 Although Bagehot was not the 
 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 8. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Respons-
es: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 14631, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w1463 
.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., George Selgin, The Courage To Refuse, ALT-M (Oct. 31, 
2015), http://www.alt-m.org/2015/10/31/courage-to-refuse. 
 10. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY 
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first person to identify these principles, he is routinely cited by 
central bankers, and we will do the same.11 According to Bage-
hot, during a liquidity crisis, the central bank should (1) lend as 
widely as possible; (2) against good collateral; and (3) at a high 
rate of interest.12 
A liquidity crisis occurs when banks and other lenders stop 
(or greatly reduce) lending to other firms, even though those 
firms are solvent and would normally have no trouble repaying 
loans. Up until the financial crisis of 2007–09, a liquidity crisis 
would normally start with a bank run or panic. In a bank run, 
depositors withdraw money from a bank because they worry 
that the bank is insolvent and will not have funds to pay them 
in the future. As depositors withdraw money, the bank needs to 
raise cash by selling its assets, including illiquid assets that it 
must sell at a discount—at fire-sale prices. Because the bank 
receives less for the assets than their fundamental value, the 
bank can be driven into actual insolvency, even if it was not 
insolvent before. The crucial troubling feature of a classic bank 
run is that a bank that may well be solvent is driven into insol-
vency, because those who are skeptical about its solvency with-
draw their money in a rush, destroying the bank; even people 
who believe the bank is solvent may withdraw their money in 
anticipation of the skeptics withdrawing their money.13 
A run on a single bank can spread rapidly to other banks. 
This contagion can occur along many pathways. Banks lend 
money to each other in order to facilitate check-clearing and 
other aspects of the payment system, and to obtain interest on 
funds that are not currently needed for customers. If one bank 
fails, then it cannot repay other banks that have deposits with 
it, which can cause the failure of those other banks as well. An-
other pathway occurs through fire sales. If a run forces one 
bank to sell its home mortgage loans in fire sales, then the 
price of home mortgage loans will decline. This means that oth-
er banks that own home mortgage loans may suffer losses, 
 
MARKET (1873). 
 11. Credit for originating the principles is usually also given to Henry 
Thornton, a British banker and politician, who died in 1815. See C.A.E. 
Goodhart, The Changing Role of Central Banks, 18 FIN. HIST. REV. 135, 136 
(2011). 
 12. BAGEHOT, supra note 10, at 196–97. 
 13. For the classic analysis, see generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip 
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 
(1983) (providing a model of a bank run). 
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alarming depositors who withdraw funds; this in turn forces 
the bank to sell additional mortgage loans in order to raise 
cash, driving the price down even further, in a downward spi-
ral. Numerous well-managed banks with mortgage loans on 
their books may be driven into insolvency. 
The essential feature of a liquidity crisis is that solvent 
banks become insolvent not because of bad loans or invest-
ments, but because of the withdrawal of liquidity. The with-
drawal of liquidity could be driven by misunderstanding as in 
our example, but also by random events and economic condi-
tions that cause people to start hoarding cash. The ultimate 
source of this fragility is the role of banks as financial 
intermediators. They obtain most of their funds from short-
term loans (deposits, which can be withdrawn at any time), and 
then lend those funds for long periods, like the thirty years of a 
typical home mortgage. The business model of banks assumes 
that depositors will, on average, keep most of their funds in the 
bank, and that as some customers withdraw their funds, those 
funds are replaced by deposits by other customers, so that the 
bank has a permanent pool of funds that it can lend out for a 
long term. If a run occurs, this model is undermined. 
As we learned during the financial crisis of 2007–09, runs 
can originate outside the banking system. For example, in the 
repo market, a firm like an investment bank or hedge fund 
raises capital by selling securities to another firm—such as a 
pension fund or insurance company—and promising to buy 
them back at a slightly higher price in a day or two. The trans-
action is functionally identical to a secured loan—the seller ob-
tains funds and then pays them back, with the securities serv-
ing as collateral. The two parties typically roll over the loan for 
long periods, with the result that the transaction approximates 
a demand deposit. At the onset of the crisis, mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) and other mortgage-derived securities served 
as collateral in many of these transactions.14 As mortgage de-
fault rates rose, the MBSs traded at lower prices, and firms lost 
confidence in their ability to value them accurately. The lend-
ers in the repo market responded by imposing larger “haircuts” 
 
 14. Mortgage-backed securities (MSBs) are bonds that are secured by 
mortgages. I use the more general term “mortgage-derived securities” to en-
compass MBSs and other securities whose value is related to mortgage pay-
ment and default rates, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
which involve a more complicated transactional structure. 
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on the collateral—meaning that the borrowers were required to 
supply additional MBSs in order to continue borrowing.15 When 
borrowers ran out of collateral, they sold off assets at fire-sale 
prices and were driven into insolvency.16 
Financial economists are divided as to whether financial 
panics are caused by pure liquidity problems—solvent firms 
that cannot borrow—or also require insolvency.17 It is, of course, 
possible for a financial crisis to start because banks have made 
bad loans. If the loans are not repaid, a bank can become insol-
vent, causing a run as depositors rush to remove their funds, 
and harming other banks and other lenders. The Savings and 
Loan (S&L) Crisis of the 1980s was probably due to such bad 
loans. Because high interest rates increased the cost of funds 
for S&Ls, they were driven to make riskier loans for which they 
could charge high rates themselves.18  Deregulation allowed 
them to branch into areas of lending in which they had little 
experience. Overinvestment in commercial building created a 
price bubble, which destroyed the S&Ls when it burst. 
Most financial crises are likely a combination of liquidity 
and solvency problems. In the 2007–08 crisis, for example, 
many financial institutions failed simply because they issued 
too many subprime mortgages that defaulted and bought too 
many mortgage-related securities, which lost value because of 
those defaults.19 These firms were highly leveraged and overex-
posed to the real estate market. The defaults indicated that the 
fundamental value of the assets was very low, in aggregate 
lower than the value of the firms’ liabilities. These firms were 
economically insolvent. However, many of the firms that suf-
fered from withdrawal of credit were well managed, not exces-
sively leveraged, and not excessively exposed to real estate. 
Lenders stopped lending to them because the lenders needed to 
hoard cash in order to protect themselves from runs, not be-
cause the lenders believed that the firms were insolvent. While 
 
 15. See GORTON, supra note 4, at 191. 
 16. See id. at 192; see also Arvind Krishnamurthy et al., Sizing Up Repo 
50–51 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17768, 2012). 
 17. For an evaluation of competing theories, see Itay Goldstein & Assaf 
Razin, Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18670, 2013). 
 18. See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 
FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 67–72 (1991). 
 19. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
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the temporary decline in the market price of the assets caused 
by the withdrawal of liquidity made the firms appear insolvent, 
they were solvent in the fundamental-value or economic sense. 
Financial crises are extreme events. They can introduce po-
litical turmoil and overthrow governments. The financial crisis 
of 2007–08 spawned the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, po-
litical polarization, and pervasive distrust of government.20 The 
immediate economic problem they cause is more complex. In 
principle, the failure of financial institutions could be self-
contained, producing no harm to anyone other than the share-
holders, creditors, and employees of the firms that collapse. 
However, economists have shown that financial crises almost 
always lead to significant recessions.21 The leading explanation 
is that banks and other financial institutions add value 
through the relationships they develop with borrowers; when 
the lenders collapse, the relationship-specific information is 
lost.22 Another explanation is that the sudden withdrawal of 
credit from the “real” economy forces businesses to lay off 
workers, sell inventories at fire-sale prices, and so on, leading 
to further downward spirals that disrupt existing commercial 
relationships.23 The financial crisis of 2007–08 caused the Great 
Recession of 2007–09, in which all of these disruptions were 
visible. 
B. THE LLR’S RESPONSE TO A LIQUIDITY CRISIS 
Conventional wisdom, as embodied in the Bagehot dictum, 
is that the LLR—typically, the central bank—should lend 
freely during a liquidity crisis against good collateral.24 The 
 
 20. See Atif Mian et al., Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in 
the Aftermath of Financial Crises 6, 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 17831, 2012). 
 21. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of 
Debt, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 573, 573–74 (2010). 
 22. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 263 (1983). 
 23. For discussions of these and other views, see Gary Gorton & Andrew 
Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
FINANCE 431, 494–99 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003); Moritz 
Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Lev-
erage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029 
(2012). 
 24. For a discussion and survey on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), 
see generally Dietrich Domanski et al., Central Banks as Lenders of Last Re-
sort: Experiences During the 2007–10 Crisis and Lessons for the Future (Fed. 
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function of the LLR is to avoid bankruptcy—and sale of assets 
at fire-sale prices—of firms that are economically solvent. The 
LLR is not supposed to rescue insolvent firms, which should be 
wound down in bankruptcy and deserve to be liquidated be-
cause they were mismanaged, and are worth more in pieces 
than as going concerns. 
The three elements of the Bagehot approach are thought to 
advance this goal. First, the LLR should lend freely, that is, to 
as many solvent firms as possible, because it needs to replace 
the withdrawal of credit from the economy by private creditors. 
The LLR should not limit itself to large or “too-big-to-fail” insti-
tutions, nor to banks. A liquidity crisis affects everyone and can 
lead everyone to sell off assets at fire-sale prices, which causes 
spiraling harm. The extension of credit by the LLR allows all 
firms to hold assets until maturity or until the credit market 
recovers. When fire sales stop and asset values recover, the cri-
sis ends, and the LLR should withdraw credit. 
Second, the LLR should lend against good collateral be-
cause it cannot afford to lose money. The meaning of good col-
lateral is not entirely clear. In Bagehot’s time, it may have 
meant government securities and other highly rated, liquid as-
sets of the sort that a central bank routinely accepts as collat-
eral during normal times.25 The Bank of England was a (most-
ly) private institution.26 If it loaned vast sums of money and 
then was not repaid, it would go bankrupt itself. While it was 
in the Bank of England’s interest to rescue the financial system 
(so that it could continue lending), it was by definition not in its 
interest to risk its own existence.27 Modern central banks are 
public institutions, but this principle has been preserved under 
the theory that central banks should not take risks with tax-
payers’ money which is the domain of the fiscal authority—
Congress and Treasury. Today, at a minimum, good collateral 
consists of assets whose “real” value (meaning value during or-
dinary times) exceeds the loan and is not excessively volatile. If 
central banks do not lend against good collateral, and are not 
 
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2014-110, 2014). 
 25. See Vincent Bignon et al., Bagehot for Beginners: The Making of the 
Lender-of-Last-Resort Operations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 65 ECON. 
HIST. REV. 580, 596–98 (2012). 
 26. See C.A.E. GOODHART, THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE FINANCIAL SYS-
TEM 334 (1995). 
 27. See id. at 333–35. 
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paid back, the taxpayer must bear the loss. The good-collateral 
requirement just means that the credit risk incurred by the 
central bank should be as low as possible. 
Third, the LLR should charge a “very high” rate of interest, 
or a “penalty” rate, in order to combat perverse incentive creat-
ed by its own existence. LLR payoffs are a kind of insurance for 
financial institutions, and all types of insurance create moral 
hazard by protecting firms from downside risk. To combat mor-
al hazard, the LLR charges a high interest rate, which means 
that the firm that receives an emergency loan is not fully in-
sured but only partially insured, much as a person with home-
owner or auto insurance must pay a deductible.28 Partial insur-
ance in all these cases provides the insured entity with an in-
centive to take care ex ante. The penalty rate also encourages 
borrowers to return to the private market as soon as it recov-
ers. It is important to understand that the penalty rate is not 
very high. It must be lower than the high rate of interest that 
prevails during the crisis; otherwise, it will not solve the liquid-
ity crisis. Typically, a penalty rate might be just a percentage 
point or so higher than the rate that existed just prior to the 
crisis.29 
However, while central bankers continue to cite Bagehot, 
the principles have evolved to meet modern requirements. 
First, central banks typically focus on the banking system ra-
ther than financial institutions generally. In the United States, 
it was thought—until the crisis—that banks played the most 
important role in financial intermediation as well as in the 
payments system. Though other firms could be allowed to fail; 
banks could not. This idea was embodied in the Federal Re-
serve Act, which authorizes the Fed to lend to banks largely as 
a matter of discretion, while permitting it to lend to non-banks 
only in exigent circumstances and subject to various procedural 
and substantive constraints.30  This principle hampered the 
Fed’s response to the financial crisis in its early stages. While 
 
 28. See Domanski et al., supra note 24, at 4–5. 
 29. Under the Fed’s current regulations, the penalty rate is fifty basis 
points above the market interest rate. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and 
the Balance Sheet, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.htm (last updated 
Feb. 23, 2017). 
 30. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012); see also infra Part II.A (explaining the 
Federal Reserve Act). 
  
2017] FED AUTHORITY DURING A CRISIS 1539 
 
the Fed did eventually extend emergency loans to non-banks, it 
initially did so slowly and grudgingly.31 
Second, central banks have found themselves hampered in 
determining whether collateral is “good” or not. During a li-
quidity crisis, assets lose their value because of the withdrawal 
of liquidity but may retain fundamental value. This means that 
a firm that holds an asset until the crisis ends will be able to 
sell it for more than the market price during the crisis. In order 
to resolve a crisis, the central bank must calculate this “real” 
value—that is, the value of the discounted stream of payoffs 
until the maturity of the asset, on the assumption that the 
credit market will eventually revive. However, it is difficult to 
determine how much of the price decline is attributable to the 
liquidity shortage and how much is attributable to fundamental 
economic variables. Some financial economists are skeptical 
that the concept of “good collateral” exists in the sense that 
Bagehot meant. For example, during the 2007–09 crisis, AAA 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) from the 2005 vintage 
(which mostly did not include subprime mortgages) lost consid-
erable value—as much as seventy or eighty percent—and today 
are trading about five to ten percent below value.32 This sug-
gests that a part of the crisis-era price decline could be at-
tributed to fundamental problems, that is, defaults that were 
unanticipated at the time the CDOs were constructed. The Fed 
ended up accepting collateral that could not be considered good 
under any definition.33 
Third, central banks do not usually demand penalty rates 
during a financial crisis.34 The Fed followed this pattern in the 
2007–08 crisis after briefly charging a modest penalty rate at 
the earliest stage. The problem with penalty rates is that the 
market interprets borrowing at a penalty rate as a signal of 
possible insolvency. A borrower will not pay above-market in-
terest for a loan unless it is desperate; if it is desperate, it is 
likely to fail even with temporary liquidity support from the 
 
 31. See DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 147–49 (2009). 
 32. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Bear’s Lair: Index Credit Default 
Swaps at the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3250, 3255 fig.1 
(2011). 
 33. See infra Part II.B; infra note 100. 
 34. See Glenn Hoggarth & Farouk Soussa, Crisis Management, Lender of 
Last Resort and the Changing Nature of the Banking Industry, in FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AND CENTRAL BANKS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 166, 174–75 (2001). 
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central bank. Creditors in the private market will therefore 
stop lending to it. This problem is acute when the financial in-
stitution in question depends on short-term loans. Short-term 
lenders can easily withdraw their funds or refuse to roll over 
loans, and quickly move their funds to a healthier institution. 
In this way, a financial institution that takes out an emergency 
loan from the LLR signs its own death warrant. To avoid 
branding emergency borrowers with the stigma of possible in-
solvency, central banks try to encourage as many institutions 
as possible to borrow from them—and this is only possible if a 
low interest rate, rather than a penalty rate, is offered. When 
many financial institutions borrow from the central bank, no 
one is stigmatized, because the weakest of them can no longer 
be singled out. 
Moreover, there is a great deal of controversy as to whether 
the availability of the LLR does, in fact, create moral hazard.35 
Financial crises are rare and unpredictable events. It is far 
from obvious how a financial institution can protect itself from 
a financial crisis. A firm that makes reckless loans will not be 
rescued by the LLR unless it happens to fail at the same time 
that a crisis takes place; but because crises are rare, a firm can 
hardly depend on such luck. Moreover, no one anticipated the 
2007–08 financial crisis; accordingly, no one could have delib-
erately made reckless loans with the expectation of being bailed 
out. The problem was not that firms thought they would be res-
cued and consequently behaved recklessly; it was that they did 
not anticipate a systemic failure, and so took no precautions 
against it. Finally, the most straightforward way of deterring 
moral hazard is not to deny firms rescue loans—which defeats 
the purpose of resolving a financial crisis—but to impose strict 
ex ante regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act did just this.36 
 
 35. Compare Selgin, supra note 9 (arguing that moral hazard is im-
portant), with GORTON, supra note 4 (arguing that moral hazard is not im-
portant). For evidence from the crisis, see Lamont K. Black & Lieu N. Hazel-
wood, The Effect of TARP on Bank Risk-Taking, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 790 (2013) 
(finding evidence of moral hazard); Philip E. Strahan & Basak Tanyeri, Once 
Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic Liquidity 
Shock, 50 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 119 (2015) (finding evidence that 
bailouts did not increase moral hazard in money market mutual fund mar-
kets); Luis Brandao-Marques et al., International Evidence on Government 
Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector (Int’l Monetary Fund, Work-
ing Paper No. 13/94, 2013) (finding evidence of moral hazard). 
 36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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C. THE LAW 
While the Fed is usually identified as the LLR in the Unit-
ed States, the LLR function is actually shared by the Fed and 
FDIC. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed was understood to 
be the LLR for solvent banks and non-banks. FDIC was the 
LLR for insolvent banks. There was no LLR for insolvent non-
banks, which necessitated creative actions by the Fed and 
FDIC during the 2007–09 financial crisis, and the enactment of 
Economic Emergency Stabilization Act (EESA) in October 
2008.37 The Dodd-Frank Act corrected this omission by provid-
ing for an orderly resolution process for insolvent financial in-
stitutions of all types.38 
The Fed’s authority to make emergency loans to banks is 
located in § 10B of the Federal Reserve Act.39 The Fed can make 
short-term loans; the loans must be secured by high-quality 
collateral; and various procedural requirements and limits 
must be respected, especially if the bank is undercapitalized. 
Under current regulations, the Fed charges a penalty of fifty 
basis points above the federal funds rate for banks in “generally 
sound financial condition,” and an additional fifty basis points 
for weaker banks.40 This type of lending is known as discount-
window lending.41 
The Fed may make loans to non-banks under § 13(3).42 This 
section requires the Fed to jump some significant procedural 
hurdles. The Fed must determine that “unusual and exigent 
circumstances” exist, and the Board of Governors must hold a 
vote with approval of a supermajority of five members.43 The 
loan must be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve 
bank,” and the borrowers must be “unable to secure adequate 
credit accommodations from other banking institutions.”44 Dodd-
Frank added an additional requirement that loans be made 
 
 37. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5201–5202, 5211–5241 (2012)). 
 38. See infra Part III.C. 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012). 
 40. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, supra note 
29. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
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through a “program or facility with broad-based eligibility,”45 
meaning that the Fed must set out in advance eligibility re-
quirements rather than pick and choose among borrowers. 
Together, these two sections were thought to implement 
Bagehot’s dictum. The Fed can lend broadly—to banks and 
non-banks—in an emergency, and must be fully secured. The 
statutes leave the Fed discretion as to how much to charge, al-
lowing the Fed to charge a penalty rate if it desires. 
FDIC is given the power to wind down banks that are un-
dercapitalized or have failed. In normal cases, FDIC pays off 
insured depositors from its insurance fund, but otherwise credi-
tors are not protected, and share in the proceeds of the sale of 
the bank’s assets according to priority, and pro rata, as in a 
normal bankruptcy. In such cases, FDIC is required to mini-
mize the cost to the insurance fund—which means paying only 
those creditors (mainly, depositors) covered by it.46 However, 
the law makes an exception where a bank’s failure “would have 
serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial sta-
bility.”47 With the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
a two-thirds majority of the Federal Reserve Board, and a two-
thirds majority of the FDIC Board of Directors, FDIC may pay 
off creditors of the bank in question.48 FDIC’s role as LLR thus 
has two components: the routine payoff of insured bank deposi-
tors, and the power to compensate other bank creditors in 
emergency circumstances. 
This leaves a significant gap, namely, for the large non-
bank financial institution that faces solvency (rather than 
merely liquidity) problems. Before Dodd-Frank, FDIC had no 
jurisdiction over non-banks, while the Fed could lend to them 
only if they had collateral. During the crisis, the Fed and FDIC 
engaged in significant legal maneuvering in order to address 
this type of institution, as we will now discuss. 
 
 45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010). 
 46. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f ) (2012). 
 47. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G). 
 48. Id. 
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II.  THE FED’S STRUGGLES WITH THE LAW DURING THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS   
The financial crisis is usually dated to the summer of 2007, 
when the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and Over-
night Indexed Swap (OIS) spread—a measure of the cost of 
short-term unsecured lending among large banks—spiked.49 
Until that time, the spread had remained very low, indicating 
that large banks trusted each other enough to lend to one an-
other at barely above the Federal Funds rate. On August 9, 
2007, BNP Paribas, a French bank, froze redemptions from 
three investment funds that held subprime mortgage-related 
assets which could no longer be valued.50  The LIBOR-OIS 
spread remained elevated through the end of 2007 and the first 
eight months of 2008. The crisis entered its acute phase after 
the collapse of Lehman on September 15, 2008. The govern-
ment’s most aggressive interventions took place during the re-
maining months of 2008 and the first six months of 2009.51 In 
the summer of 2009, the LIBOR-OIS spread returned to its his-
torical level, indicating that the crisis was over. 
A. ACTING WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY 
The Fed’s initial responses to the financial crisis occurred 
after the BNP Paribas announcement, and in this initial phase, 
the Fed used traditional instruments that were well within its 
statutory powers. On August 17, 2007, the Fed lowered the in-
terest rate for discount-window loans and extended the term of 
those loans.52 The Fed’s authority to make loans to banks that 
are temporarily in need of liquidity is codified in § 10B of the 
 
 49. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit 
Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 85–86 (2009). 
 50. Jason Hsu & Max Moroz, Shadow Banks and the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008, in THE BANKING CRISIS HANDBOOK 39, 49–50 (Greg N. Gregoriou 
ed., 2010). 
 51. There are many narratives of the government’s response to the finan-
cial crisis, including popular books and academic works. See, e.g., ALAN S. 
BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED (2013); WESSEL, supra note 31; Randall 
S. Kroszner & William Melick, The Response of the Federal Reserve to the 
Recent Banking and Financial Crisis (Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the University of Chicago Library). 
 52. Press Release, Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., For Immediate Re-
lease (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20070817a.htm. 
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Federal Reserve Act.53 In September of 2007, the Fed lowered 
its target federal funds rate from 5.25% to 4.75%.54 It would 
continue lowering the interest rate during the crisis, reaching 
zero percent in December 2008.55 The Fed’s authority to adjust 
the target federal funds rate by trading securities on the open 
market is codified in § 14 of the Federal Reserve Act.56 No one 
questioned the Fed’s legal authority to engage in these ac-
tions.57 
However, these actions were insufficient. Banks are reluc-
tant to borrow from the discount window because of stigma. 
Although the loans are nominally secret, analysts and other 
market actors can discover whether banks took emergency 
loans simply by asking bank executives and inferring a “yes” if 
no answer is provided.58 The Fed sets the interest rate for 
emergency lending above the market rate in order to encourage 
banks, if possible, to use the market. But this means that a 
bank that takes an emergency loan from the Fed cannot obtain 
loans from the market, which indicates that it might fail at any 
time. As a result, potential investors and lenders may be reluc-
tant to put money in the bank, hastening its demise. Nonethe-
less, the Fed made 26,395 loans from the discount window, to-
taling almost $11 trillion,59 during the crisis (August 2007 to 
December 2009).60 In December 2007, the Fed tried to mitigate 
the stigma effect of discount-window lending by auctioning off 
 
 53. 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a) (2012). 
 54. Press Release, Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., For Immediate Re-
lease (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/ 
monetary/20070918a.htm. 
 55. Technically, the Fed targeted a range from 0% to 0.25%. For data, see 
Effective Federal Funds Rate, ECON RES.: FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https:// 
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/fedfunds (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
 56. 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012) (granting authority to purchase and sell cable 
transfers, acceptances, and bills). 
 57. The Fed’s discount-window lending appears to have satisfied other 
legal requirements, including collateral requirements. See R. Alton Gilbert et 
al., Federal Reserve Lending to Troubled Banks During the Financial Crisis, 
2007–2010, 94 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 221, 221–42 (2012). 
 58. See Domanksi et al., supra note 24, at 10–11 (discussing the impedi-
ment of stigma in the 2008 financial crisis). 
 59. The vastness of this number is misleading. Many loans were very 
short term—for example, overnight. The Fed did not at any time lend out that 
much money in the aggregate. 
 60. Allen N. Berger et al., The Federal Reserve’s Discount Window and 
TAF Programs: “Pushing on a String?” 38 tbl.1 (Jan. 2017) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with University of Chicago Library). 
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the emergency loans rather than setting an arbitrarily high 
price for them. The Term Auction Facility (TAF),61 as the pro-
gram was called, resulted in an additional 3937 loans, totaling 
$3.7 trillion.62 While these programs did increase bank lend-
ing,63 they did not unfreeze the credit market. Indeed, major 
banks preferred to increase their liquidity by borrowing from 
Federal Home Loan Banks—whose emergency lending powers 
were apparently off the radar screen—and attracting insured 
deposits.64 
The lowering of interest rates also failed to end the crisis. 
In theory, by lowering rates, the Fed reduces the cost of funds 
for banks and increases their incentive to lend. Home buyers 
can take advantage of low interest rates to obtain affordable 
mortgages, and existing homeowners can refinance their mort-
gages, providing them with additional cash to buys goods and 
services. However, the mechanism through which lower rates 
lead to greater lending had broken down. The financial crisis 
was caused by uncertainty about the value of mortgage-related 
assets owned by banks and other creditors. Banks and other 
financial institutions stopped lending because they could not 
determine the value of mortgage-related assets offered as col-
lateral and the credit risk of borrowers that owned great quan-
tities of mortgage-related assets. Fire sales of mortgage-related 
assets caused a collapse in their prices, which rendered many 
creditors insolvent based on market values, and so unable to 
lend, borrow, or raise capital. The modestly increased incentive, 
if any, to make loans encouraged by the interest rate cuts could 
not offset these massive risks. Moreover, as creditors realized 
that they could have trouble borrowing money, they hoarded 
cash rather than lent it out, so that they could repay their cred-
itors or pay their expenses if further credit was not forthcom-
ing. Home buyers and homeowners could not take advantage of 
low interest rates because creditors stopped lending.65 
 
 61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Report to the Secretary of the 
Treasury from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (July 30, 2008), https://www 
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1094.aspx. 
 62. Berger et al., supra note 60. 
 63. See id. at 4–5. 
 64. See Adam Ashcraft et al., The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The 
Lender of Next-to-Last Resort?, 42 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 551, 552 
(2010). 
 65. See GORTON, supra note 4, at 186–94. 
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The more fundamental problem was that the source of the 
crisis lay outside traditional bank activities, in the shadow 
banking system. Most banks did not suffer from runs; deposit 
insurance and perhaps the discount window and related 
sources of support from the Fed reassured depositors that they 
would not lose their funds if banks failed.66 Runs occurred in 
the repo market, affecting investment banks, pensions, insur-
ance companies, hedge funds, and other non-bank institutions; 
and against prime brokers—also usually investment banks—
which offered various credit-related services to their clients. 
These institutions could not access the discount window or 
TAF. They might have been helped indirectly by the reduction 
in interest rates if banks had been willing to lend to them, but 
banks were reluctant to lend to them because the banks could 
not be sure that the borrowers were solvent. 
To address the problems in the shadow banking system, 
the Fed was forced to draw on its authority under § 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act, which at the time (it has since been 
amended67) allowed the Fed to make emergency loans to “indi-
viduals, partnerships, and corporations”—in other words, peo-
ple and institutions other than banks—“in unusual and exigent 
circumstances.”68 A supermajority of the members of the Board 
of Governors was needed to authorize these loans, and the 
loans must be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Re-
serve bank” that makes the loan.69 The Fed had not made a 
loan under § 13(3) since the Great Depression, and Fed officials 
were reluctant to use this law at first.70 But the law is the law, 
and many of the Fed’s actions under § 13(3) were clearly lawful. 
For example, on March 11, 2008, the Fed created the Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), through which the Fed 
loaned Treasury securities to primary dealers (major invest-
ment banks) that posted collateral.71 By this time, it was clear 
 
 66. See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN 
STREET FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 292–93 (2012) 
(“Because of the confidence of an FDIC guarantee, [banks] were awash with 
funds.”). 
 67. The amendments are discussed infra Part III.C. 
 68. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A) (2012). 
 69. Id. 
 70. BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND 
ITS AFTERMATH 205–06 (2015) (explaining the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to 
use § 13(3) in the 2008 crisis). 
 71. Monetary Policy: Term Securities Lending Facility, BOARD GOVER-
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that “unusual and exigent circumstances” existed—a major col-
lapse of the credit markets. The loans were made against col-
lateral already used in the repo market, including investment-
grade corporate bonds and mortgage-backed securities. In the 
initial stages of the TSLF, the collateral was highly rated, al-
most certainly qualifying as “good collateral.”72 On March 16, 
2008, the Fed supplemented the TSLF with the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF), through which primary dealers could 
obtain short-term cash loans by posting the same types of col-
lateral.73 The PDCF was also legally straightforward—although 
as we will discuss in the next section, some questions arise as 
to the quality of the collateral that the Fed accepted. 
However, while firms borrowed huge sums through the 
TSLF and PDCF, the facilities failed to resolve the crisis.74 The 
rescue of Bear, also in March 2008, was probably a more im-
portant intervention at the time, since it indicated—or seemed 
to indicate—that the Fed would not allow a major financial in-
stitution to fail. As I will discuss below, the Bear rescue was 
legally questionable. By contrast, the TSLF and the PDCF were 
hardly used throughout the crisis other than during its acute 
phase in September 2008. Investment banks feared stigma in 
the same way that commercial banks feared the stigma of the 
discount window. The Fed’s legal authorities were inadequate 
for resolving the crisis. 
 
NORS FED. RES. SYS. (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/tslf.htm. 
 72. The collateral used in the TSLF decreased in quality over time, rais-
ing the question whether the “good collateral” requirement was consistently 
satisfied. But, unlike the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) collateral, the 
TSLF collateral never fell below investment grade. See Term Securities Lend-
ing Facility and TSLF Options Program, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/tslf.xls (last visited Mar. 14, 
2017). 
 73. See Regulatory Reform: Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), 
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
reform_pdcf.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 74. To review the data, see Regulatory Reform: Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) and TSLF Options Program (TOP), BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_tslf.htm#data 
(last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
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B. STRETCHING THE LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY AND VIOLATING 
THE LAW 
In March 2007, a run began against Bear. Bear was a large 
investment bank and primary dealer, which borrowed heavily 
on the repo market. Its creditors lost confidence in Bear and 
refused to roll over the loans.75 
Fearing a systemic failure, the Fed authorized a $12.9 bil-
lion bridge loan to JP Morgan, which JP Morgan would then 
lend to Bear, using as collateral $13.8 billion in securities 
owned by Bear.76 The loan was originally directed at JP Morgan 
so as to avoid having to rely on § 13(3). But this bit of legal leg-
erdemain, crafted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s 
(FRBNY) general counsel, was nixed by the Federal Reserve 
Board’s general counsel.77 The Fed ended up citing § 13(3). The 
loan bought time which Bear used to find a purchaser. Merger 
negotiations between JP Morgan and Bear commenced. In the 
final transaction, which was consummated on March 24, 2008, 
the Fed created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) called “Maiden 
Lane,” which was financed from a $28.82 billion loan from the 
Fed and a $1.15 billion subordinated loan from JP Morgan.78 
The Fed was given the “residual interest,”79 meaning the equi-
ty, in the assets. Maiden Lane purchased toxic assets from 
Bear, including agency MBSs, commercial and residential 
loans, non-agency residential MBSs, and other derivatives. 
Under these terms, JP Morgan and the Fed shared the 
downside. If the value of the assets declined up to $1.15 billion, 
JP Morgan would absorb the entire loss; if it declined more, 
then the Fed would absorb the residual loss up to $28.82 bil-
 
 75. My account follows the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s re-
port. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: OP-
PORTUNITIES EXIST TO STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING 
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 22–26, 178–84 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d11696.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT]. 
 76. The loan was routed through JP Morgan, but the Fed recognized that 
the loan was functionally a loan to Bear. 
 77. See BERNANKE, supra note 70, at 214. 
 78. Id. at 221–23. 
 79. Documents Relating to the Bailout of Bear Stearns, INTERNET AR-
CHIVE, https://archive.org/stream/DocumentsRelatingToTheBailoutOfBear 
Sterns_472/2009-164DocPt3_djvu.txt (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). See generally 
Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
markets/maidenlane.html#significanttransactionterms (last visited Mar. 14, 
2017). 
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lion. The Fed alone benefited from the upside. If the assets 
were sold for more than $30 billion, then JP Morgan and the 
Fed would be paid off in full, and the Fed would receive the re-
sidual. As it turned out, the assets appreciated, and the Fed 
earned a profit. 
The Fed invoked § 13(3) for this transaction with little ex-
planation. The theory was apparently that the transaction was 
secured to the Fed’s satisfaction, and that the loan was directed 
to a non-bank in unusual and exigent circumstances, as § 13(3) 
permitted. This argument could certainly be used to justify the 
initial bridge loan—assuming that Bear’s collateral was actual-
ly adequate, for which there is no evidence one way or the oth-
er.80 However, the Maiden Lane transaction was less clearly 
lawful. 
The Fed does not have the authority to buy assets other 
than Treasury securities and a few other types of assets used in 
open-market operations.81  If the Fed had simply purchased 
MBSs and the other toxic assets for $30 billion, it would have 
violated the law. The transaction was structured to avoid this 
type of blatant illegality. Instead of buying assets, the Fed 
made a secured loan to Maiden Lane, which then paid the Fed 
back. A secured loan falls more comfortably into the Fed’s 
§ 13(3) authority. 
The problem with this approach is that the transaction 
provided that the value of the Fed’s interest would be tightly 
connected to the value of the underlying assets. If the assets 
fell in value by as little as four percent, the Fed would lose 
money. If the assets rose in value, the Fed would receive the 
entire gain. By contrast, in a secured loan—and especially a 
loan secured by “good” collateral, that is, high-quality collat-
eral, in Bagehot’s sense—the lender bears very little to no risk 
from the fluctuation of asset values. Functionally, the Maiden 
Lane transaction was a sale of assets, not a secured loan.82 
 
 80. The data set posted at the Federal Reserve discloses the type of collat-
eral but uncharacteristically does not break it down by rating. See Bridge 
Loan to Bear Stearns through JP Morgan Chase, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/blbs.xls (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2017). Oddly, the data set shows the collateral as of 2010 rather than 
when the loan was originated in March 2008. 
 81. 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012). 
 82. See Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Cir-
cumstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PENN. J. BUS. 
L. 221, 236 (2011); Thomas Porter, The Federal Reserve’s Catch-22: A Legal 
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The PDCF itself raises legal questions. Section 13(3) allows 
the Fed to make secured loans but the loans must be “secured 
to the satisfaction” of the Fed.83 The PDCF accepted CCC and 
other low-rated collateral and indeed collateral that was not 
rated at all, including equity interests that were not traded and 
exceedingly difficult to value.84 
The Fed might argue that “secured to [its] satisfaction” 
means that complete discretion is vested in the Fed. But if this 
were true, then the Fed could issue unsecured loans based on 
collateral with no value. The statute limits the Fed to secured 
loans, and the Fed must make a good-faith determination that 
the collateral adequately secures it.85 For example, the Fed 
would be justified in arguing that collateral trading at a low 
market value adequately secures it because crisis conditions 
suppress the price. But the Fed would not be justified in taking 
as collateral assets whose fundamental value is minimal. Be-
cause the Fed has not disclosed its analysis of the collateral, we 
do not know whether it acted lawfully or not, but we are not 
required to take its word for it, and the large quantity of un-
rated and low-rated assets that it accepted as collateral in the 
PDCF provides grounds for skepticism. 
The Fed’s rescue of AIG in September 2008 faced similar 
obstacles, forcing the Fed to evade the law yet again. It created 
two new SPVs—Maiden Lane II, which purchased MBSs and 
related assets from AIG’s insurance subsidiaries; and Maiden 
Lane III, which purchased CDOs from AIG’s counterparties.86 
In both cases, the Fed shared the downside with AIG and was 
given a major share of the profits—that is, equity. These two 
transactions were legally dubious in the same way that the 
original Maiden Lane transaction was. 
Another aspect of the AIG rescue was legally questionable. 
In the initial transaction, the Fed loaned $85 billion to AIG se-
cured by all its assets and, in addition to charging interest and 
 
Analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 
483 (2009). But see WALLACH, supra note 1, at 53–54. 
 83. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012). 
 84. See Primary Dealer Credit Facility Data, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/pdcf.xls (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2017). 
 85. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3). 
 86. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL 
CRISES 246 (2014). 
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fees, the Fed took nearly eighty percent of AIG’s equity. The 
equity was put into a trust whose beneficiary was the U.S. 
Treasury. A court later held that the transaction violated the 
law because § 13(3) does not give the Fed the authority to take 
equity in return for a loan.87 
Later in the fall of 2008, the Fed opened additional credit 
facilities. To stop a run on money market mutual funds, the 
Fed opened the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Mar-
ket Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIF).88 It also opened the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Term As-
set-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).89 All of these facili-
ties formally made “loans,” consistent with § 13(3) and the 
Fed’s other authorities. But, other than TALF,90 they all raised 
legal problems. 
Through the AMLF, the Fed made nonrecourse loans to 
banks, which in turn used the money to buy asset-backed com-
mercial paper from money market mutual funds.91 The banks 
used the asset-backed commercial paper as collateral for the 
Fed loans. Thus, formally the Fed made secured loans to banks, 
though, perhaps in recognition that the ultimate beneficiaries 
were non-banks, the Fed cited its § 13(3) authority. Functional-
ly, the banks were used as conduits through which the Fed 
purchased the asset-backed commercial paper. If commercial 
paper dropped in value, the Fed would be left holding the col-
lateral, with no recourse against the banks. So, just like in a 
sale, the Fed bore the risk of the decline of asset values. Unlike 
 
 87. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 466 (2015) (holding 
that the Fed’s taking of equity ownership and voting control constituted an 
illegal exaction under the Fifth Amendment). Disclosure: I worked on this case 
for the plaintiff. 
 88. Regulatory Reform: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_amlf.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 
2016); Money Market Investor Funding Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. 
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm (last updated 
Feb. 5, 2010). 
 89. Regulatory Reform: Commercial Paper Funding Facility, BOARD GOV-
ERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_cpff 
.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 90. Through TALF, the Fed effectively made loans to businesses, which 
were secured by various securities, consistent with § 13(3). See FEDERAL RE-
SERVE REPORT, supra note 75, at app. XII. 
 91. Id. at app. II, at 28–29. 
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a sale, the Fed did not have a share of the upside, but would be 
required to return the collateral to the banks if they repaid the 
loans. The MMIF complemented the AMLF by enabling money 
market mutual funds to sell other types of short-term debt in-
struments, including unsecured commercial paper.92 A more 
complicated structure, involving SPVs, protected the Fed from 
more of the downside, but did not cure the legal infirmities. 
In the case of the CPFF, the veil was dropped. The Fed set 
up a SPV called CPFF LC, which purchased commercial paper, 
both secured and unsecured, directly from issuers.93 The Fed 
funded CPFF LC with secured loans. Accordingly, the risk of 
any variation in asset values—up or down—would be borne by 
the Fed. This could be viewed simply as a purchase of assets 
(the commercial paper) or, indirectly, as an unsecured loan to 
the issuers, in either case the Fed was in violation of the law, 
which does not authorize asset purchases and requires all loans 
to be secured.94 
The Fed’s legal division made two arguments that the 
CPFF was lawful.95 First, it argued that the recipient of the 
loan was CPFF LC, and that the loan was secured by the com-
mercial paper owned by CPFF LC. Accordingly, the transaction 
was a loan secured to the satisfaction of the Fed. However, this 
argument is specious as it would allow the Fed to make an un-
secured loan to anyone simply by creating an SPV. Imagine, for 
example, that the Fed would like to make an unsecured loan to 
Joe Shmo, who has no assets. Following the legal division’s ad-
vice, the Fed could create an SPV called Shmo LC. Shmo LC 
would then lend money to Joe, and in return receive an unse-
cured note from him, that is, an IOU. Shmo LC would get its 
money from the Fed, which would make a § 13(3) loan to Shmo 
LC secured by Shmo’s note. Functionally, this is an unsecured 
loan to Shmo. If he defaults on the loan from Shmo LC, Shmo 
 
 92. Id. at app. X. 
 93. Id. at app. VII. 
 94. See WALLACH, supra note 1, at 94–96; Mehra, supra note 82, at 244–
45. 
 95. See Memorandum from Legal Division on Authority of the Federal 
Reserve To Provide Extensions of Credit in Connection with a Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to File (Mar. 9, 2009), http://fcic-static.law 
.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-03-09_Federal_Reserve_Bank_Letter_ 
from_Legal_Division_to_Files_Re_Authority_of_the_Federal_Reserve_to_ 
provide_extensions_of_credit_in_connection_with_a_commercial_paper_ 
funding_facility_CPFF.pdf. 
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LC would have no money to repay the Fed, and the collateral—
Shmo’s note—would be worthless. 
One could argue that the relevant language in § 13(3), “se-
cured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank,” just 
means that the Fed must jump through the legal hoops of filing 
notice of a security interest and can take a security interest in 
whatever it wants, such as the cash it advances to the borrower 
and the proceeds (if any) from the borrower’s use of that cash. 
The Fed has never made this argument, as I far as I know. The 
reason is most likely that the Fed, Congress, and all other rele-
vant actors have always understood § 13(3) to implement 
Bagehot, which requires “real” security—in the sense of collat-
eral that would render the loan riskless or close to that, based 
on (good-faith) predictions of post-crisis collateral values. Note 
that if the Fed did believe that it could make unsecured loans, 
its claim that a Lehman rescue was illegal would be impossible 
to defend. 
The Fed’s legal division made a second argument in de-
fense of the CPFF. It argued that that Fed could deem the loan 
“secured to [its] satisfaction” because in these cases the issuer 
was charged an “insurance fee” of 100 basis points.96 The insur-
ance fee was in essence a premium, which, multiplied by the 
number of borrowers, created an “insurance fund” that could be 
used to pay the Fed if borrowers defaulted.97 
This argument is also exceedingly questionable. The legal 
division simply redescribes an unsecured loan as a secured 
loan. To see why, note that every unsecured loan—in private 
markets as well as Fed loans—carries with it an interest rate 
that is higher than the interest rate of a secured loan, all else 
equal. This “premium” can be described as an insurance fee if 
you want: the point of it is to compensate the borrower for the 
extra risk that results from the absence of collateral. A private 
bank makes hundreds of unsecured loans; it can certainly 
claim, if the Fed’s reasoning is correct, that the high interest 
rate is a “premium,” and so goes into an “insurance fund” that 
can be used to compensate the bank if borrowers default. If this 
logic is accepted, every unsecured loan is actually a secured 
loan. Try telling that to your bank examiner (who may well be 
the Fed itself )! 
 
 96. Id. at 7. 
 97. Id. at 7–8. 
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C. PREVENTED FROM TAKING NECESSARY ACTIONS 
Despite their elastic interpretations of the law, government 
officials—including Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner—claimed 
that legal restrictions prevented the Fed from rescuing Leh-
man.98 They argue that Lehman, unlike Bear and other institu-
tions, was insolvent, and accordingly could not be saved under 
§ 13(3). 
This claim has engendered great controversy. First, § 13(3) 
does not require that the borrower be solvent; it requires that 
loans be secured. Up until Lehman’s bankruptcy, the Fed made 
loans to Lehman through the PDCF, including a $28 billion 
loan on September 15, 2008.99 The loans were lawful because 
they were backed by Lehman’s collateral. The Fed evidently felt 
that even highly dubious collateral—C-rated and unrated secu-
rities—could secure the PDCF loans.100 If the Fed was correct, it 
could have lawfully continued lending to Lehman, enabling the 
investment bank to pay off many of its counterparties. The Fed 
could also have purchased the securities using the SPV mecha-
nism developed for the Bear rescue. 
Moreover, the New York Times reported that lower-level of-
ficials in FRBNY believed that Lehman was solvent.101 A subse-
quent FDIC report found that Lehman was insolvent, but only 
barely.102 And a careful academic study finds that Lehman was 
economically solvent until the first week of September 2008, 
when it started unloading its assets at crisis-driven prices.103 
While FRBNY might have believed that it would lose money on 
a loan to Lehman, it could certainly have extended credit for a 
long enough period to permit an orderly wind-down. Moreover, 
 
 98. See BERNANKE, supra note 70, at 258–65; GEITHNER, supra note 86, at 
186; HENRY M. PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COL-
LAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 182–86 (2010). 
 99. See Primary Dealer Credit Facility, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. 
SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm#data (last 
updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 100. The collateral descriptions are also available at the Fed’s website. See 
id. 
 101. James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Lehman Revisited: The Bailout That 
Never Was, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 30, 2014, at A1. 
 102. The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2011, at 1. 
 103. See Emily Kapur, The Next Lehman Bankruptcy, in MAKING FAILURE 
FEASIBLE: HOW BANKRUPTCY REFORM CAN END “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 175, 187–
99 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2015). 
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the Fed could very likely have made fully secured loans to 
Lehman earlier in 2008, before Lehman’s assets lost value. Be-
cause a rescue at an earlier date would have made Lehman’s 
fire sales unnecessary, Lehman would not have been driven 
into (or near) insolvency by those sales. 
Second, contemporary evidence indicates that the major 
reasons for letting Lehman fail were political and operational 
rather than legal. Paulson wanted to avoid being labeled “Mr. 
Bailout”—for political, and possibly ideological reasons, he 
wanted to avoid another Bear-style bailout. Paulson and others 
also worried that a Lehman bailout would create moral haz-
ard.104 At the same time, the Fed was prepared to provide fi-
nancial assistance if Barclays agreed to purchase Lehman, as 
everyone hoped.105 It is hard to believe that Bernanke and the 
others would have facilitated a purchase if they believed that 
Lehman was deeply insolvent, since such a purchase would 
have damaged Barclays, one of the largest banks in the world 
and an even more important institution than Lehman. Finally, 
Bernanke seemed more concerned that the Fed would lose 
money on a bailout than that the bailout was illegal. As I will 
discuss below, a risky loan, even if legal, might have angered 
Congress and posed a threat to the Fed’s independence. 
All that said, the questionable legality of a Lehman rescue 
provided a convenient excuse to government officials whose 
economic, political, and operational judgments were under 
heavy scrutiny. Moreover, some combination of legal and politi-
cal norms must have led Bernanke to advise Paulson in Sep-
tember that the Fed’s limits had been reached, and that Con-
gress must be approached.106 Bernanke may have believed that 
the financial crisis required the government to buy toxic assets, 
make equity investments in banks, make unsecured loans, and 
engage in other transactions that either the Fed could not en-
gage in, or could engage in only to a limited extent.107 These 
considerations could have taken different forms. Perhaps mar-
ginal violations of the law were permissible, but wholesale vio-
lations were not. Or perhaps the Fed lacked the institutional 
capacity to rescue the entire financial system—it just did not 
 
 104. PAULSON, supra note 98, at 109–10; see WESSEL, supra note 31, at 
174–75. 
 105. See WESSEL, supra note 31, at 21. 
 106. See BERNANKE, supra note 70, at 299. 
 107. See id. 
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have enough staff, experience, and resources. Or perhaps the 
Fed sought to force Congress to share the political blame for 
the unpopular bailouts. 
Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act on October 3, 2008.108 However, the legislative response was 
far from ideal. In its first attempt, the House of Representa-
tives voted down the bill, with nearly catastrophic consequenc-
es for the financial system.109 The Dow Jones index fell eight 
percent. A later bill, overloaded with pork, did pass. There is 
little evidence that members of the House or Senate understood 
what was at stake; they deferred to the expertise of the agency 
heads.110 Hearings were expedited; witnesses who disagreed 
with the bills under considerations were not permitted to testi-
fy.111 Rather than resolve any of the policy debates, Congress 
gave enormous discretion to Treasury to spend hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars as it saw fit, subject to very loose supervision. 
How can we summarize the relationship between the law 
and the Fed’s actions? The overall picture is complex. The Fed 
arguably violated the law on several occasions, flagrantly vio-
lated it on a few occasions, but also acted as though the law put 
limits on what it could accomplish. In particular, the Fed felt 
constrained, on some (but not all) occasions, by legal prohibi-
tions on asset purchases, equity investments, and unsecured 
lending. 
D. TREASURY 
The Fed was not the only government agency that violated 
the law during the financial crisis. Treasury and FDIC did as 
well. 
During the run on money market mutual funds in Septem-
ber 2008, Treasury supplemented the Fed’s rescue efforts by 
creating an insurance program for money market mutual 
funds. In return for a fee, a fund would receive a Treasury 
 
 108. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–
5261 (2012)). 
 109. See John Samples, Lawless Policy: TARP as Congressional Failure, 
660 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 6–8 (2010). 
 110. See id. at 9–10. 
 111. Charles W. Calomiris & Urooj Khan, An Assessment of TARP Assis-
tance to Financial Institutions, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 55 n.2 (2015); Samples, 
supra note 109, at 4–9. 
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guarantee for its investors.112 The purpose of this program was 
to restore confidence in money market mutual funds. Treasury 
made available $50 billion for this program from the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (ESF).113 
The ESF was created by Congress in 1934 for the purpose 
of stabilizing foreign exchange rates, as the name implies.114 
The law empowered Treasury to do so by giving it the authority 
to buy treasury securities, gold, foreign exchange, “and other 
instruments of credit and securities the Secretary considers 
necessary.”115 While this language is vague, in context it clearly 
means that if the Secretary believes that Treasury must pur-
chase or sell some other security in order to maintain the value 
of the dollar in terms of gold or foreign currencies, it may do so. 
As far as I know, neither Treasury nor anyone else has of-
fered a legal argument that the use of ESF to guarantee money 
market mutual funds was lawful. Guaranteeing the funds was 
not designed to affect the value of the U.S. dollar.116 Guarantee-
ing funds is not the same thing as dealing in securities; nor is 
there any other language in the statute that implies power to 
guarantee money market mutual funds or any other institu-
tions. Nothing in the law authorized Treasury to require pre-
miums in return for the guarantee. 
The government’s lack of legal power to address the finan-
cial crisis led to the enactment of EESA.117 This law put im-
mense resources at Treasury’s disposal, subject to exceptionally 
broad limits. Nonetheless, Treasury violated those limits. The 
statute authorizes it “to purchase . . . troubled assets from any 
financial institution.”118 “Troubled assets” are mortgages, mort-
gage-related securities, and “any other financial instrument 
 
 112. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guar-
anty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury 
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1147.aspx. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012). 
 115. Id. 
 116. It is possible to argue that by rescuing money market funds, Treasury 
indirectly rescued European banks—which relied on funding from the money 
market mutual funds—and in this way prevented the euro from collapsing and 
hence the dollar from appreciating against the euro. But Treasury did not 
make this argument, no doubt because no one would have believed it. 
 117. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–
5261 (2012)). 
 118. 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2012). 
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that the Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is nec-
essary to promote financial market stability.”119 A “financial 
institution” “means any institution, including, but not limited 
to, any bank, savings association,” etc.—with a list of other 
standard financial institutions.120 
Treasury violated these limits in two programs. First, in 
the Homeowner Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 
Treasury attempted to pay loan servicers, investors, and home-
owner to renegotiate mortgages.121 Paying a loan servicer to re-
negotiate a loan is not the same thing as buying a financial in-
strument. Although the latter term is not defined in EESA, it 
can be found in other areas of the law. For example, the Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that: 
“Instrument” means a negotiable instrument or any other writing 
that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not 
itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary 
course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary 
indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment 
property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to 
payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or infor-
mation contained on or for use with the card.122 
Courts distill this definition into two elements: (1) a writ-
ing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obliga-
tion; (2) of a type that in ordinary course of business is trans-
ferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assign-
ment.123 
 
 119. Id. § 5202(9). 
 120. Id. § 5202(5). 
 121. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 122. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(47) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
Similar definitions can be found in federal law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) 
(2012); 26 U.S.C. § 731(c)(2)(C) (2012); see also United States v. Sargent, 504 
F.3d 767, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that postage statements are not fi-
nancial instruments); United States v. Howick, 263 F.3d 1056, 1067–69 (9th 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002) (stating that phony Federal Re-
serve notes are fictitious instruments). 
 123. See, e.g., In re Omega Envtl. Inc., 219 F.3d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam) (holding that a certificate of deposit is an instrument); see also In 
re Newman, 993 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an annuity contract 
is not an instrument because it is not transferred in the regular course of 
business); In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc., 392 B.R. 814, 833–34 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that surety bonds are not instruments because they are not 
transferrable by delivery in the ordinary course of business and do not provide 
for the payment of any sum certain). 
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Treasury set up HAMP by creating a model contract enti-
tled, no doubt with the language of EESA in mind, the Com-
mitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Partic-
ipation Agreement.124 Fannie Mae, as financial agent of the 
United States, was authorized to enter this contract with any 
loan servicer eligible to participate in the program. Under the 
contract, Fannie Mae pays loan servicers to modify mortgage 
contracts in favor of homeowners, using funds made available 
to Treasury under EESA. In addition, Fannie Mae channels 
money through the loan servicer to homeowners who stay cur-
rent with HAMP-modified loans and investors whose contrac-
tual rights are modified. 
The contract modification is embodied in a writing but it 
does not evidence a right to the payment of a monetary obliga-
tion. Instead, it evidences a right to the modification of mort-
gages held by others. Someone who possesses the Financial In-
strument, whether Fannie Mae or a transferee, would have no 
right to obtain money from anyone. In addition, writings evi-
dencing rights to loan modifications are not transferred by de-
livery in the ordinary course of business. Such rights may be 
assigned as part of a contract, but their value is not embodied 
in a piece of paper which is routinely transferred as a way of 
conveying value, as is the case for checks, securities, and other 
conventional financial instruments. 
The other violation took place during the automaker 
bailout. In the fall of 2008 and the first half of 2009, Treasury 
used TARP funds to advance loans to GM and Chrysler, both of 
which ultimately entered bankruptcy and reemerged with 
stripped-down operations and modified capital structures.125 
GM and Chrysler are not financial institutions but ordinary 
businesses, and hence to all appearances beyond the scope of 
Treasury’s authority under EESA. Treasury noted that GM and 
Chrysler each owned a financial subsidiary, which advanced 
funds to car buyers, but Treasury could have made loans to 
 
 124. See COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT AND SER-
VICER PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Documents_ 
Contracts_Agreements/bankunited_Redacted.pdf. 
 125. See In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler II), 576 F.3d 108, 121–22 (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Motors Liquidation Co. (Mo-
tors II), 430 B.R. 65, 91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), reh’g denied, 2010 WL 
3565494 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010). 
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those subsidiaries without also making loans to the holding 
companies. Treasury also argued that the automakers were in-
terconnected with the financial institutions.126 If Chrysler col-
lapsed, then Chrysler Financial would collapse as well—it 
would not have Chrysler customers to lend to—and the collapse 
of Chrysler Financial would reverberate throughout the finan-
cial system, exacerbating the liquidity crisis.127 
As far as I am aware, the government never attempted to 
demonstrate that collapse of Chrysler Financial or GM Finan-
cial would have caused a systemic failure. By the time of the 
bankruptcies in the late spring of 2009, the immediate threat to 
the financial system had been resolved. If the Secretary’s say-so 
was entitled to deference, as one court concluded,128 then the 
restriction to financial institutions in the statute would have 
been meaningless, since all businesses are connected to the fi-
nancial system.129 In bankruptcy, the government used its pow-
er as debtor-in-possession financer to manipulate payoffs, en-
suring that lower-priority but politically connected groups like 
auto workers were paid more than secured creditors and equal-
priority unsecured creditors. While courts ultimately approved 
the bankruptcy outcomes (with some litigation pending130), 
scholars have persuasively argued that the wealth transfers 
that took place through the bankruptcy process violated bank-
ruptcy law.131 
E. FDIC 
During the crisis, FDIC went well beyond its normal role of 
providing insurance to bank depositors. In October 2008, it cre-
ated the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP).132 
 
 126. Chrysler II, 576 F.3d at 121–22. 
 127. Id. at 122 n.14. 
 128. Motors II, 430 B.R. at 94. 
 129. In Chrysler II and Motors II, challenges to Treasury’s authority were 
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 130. A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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 132. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSUR-
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The TLGP was composed of two pieces: a Debt Guarantee Pro-
gram (DGP) and a Transaction Account Guarantee Program 
(TAGP).133 Under the DGP, banks paid a fee to the FDIC fund 
in return for guarantees of new unsecured debt.134 Under the 
TAGP, banks could pay for the extension of deposit insurance 
to non-interest bearing accounts greater than $250,000, that is, 
beyond the then-existing limit of deposit insurance (which had 
been raised from $100,000 on October 3, 2008135).136 TAGP was 
designed to deter large depositors like businesses from with-
drawing funds from demand deposit accounts, while DGP ena-
bled banks to raise more funds if withdrawals nonetheless oc-
curred.137 The programs were made available not only to in-
sured banks, but to bank-holding companies and bank affiliates 
that are not entitled to ordinary FDIC deposit insurance. 
FDIC claimed authority for TLGP under § 13(c) of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act.138 The law authorizes FDIC “to 
make loans to, to make deposits in, to purchase the assets or 
securities of, to assume the liabilities of, or to make contribu-
tions to, any insured depository institution” in order to prevent 
it from defaulting; to restore it to normal operation; or to pre-
vent it from taking down other banks, “when severe financial 
conditions exist,” if the collapse of those other banks would 
threaten the FDIC fund.139 Other provisions dictate that FDIC 
must satisfy “least-cost” requirements, meaning that it must 
use the least costly method of helping a bank, and should not 
benefit uninsured creditors, shareholders, and affiliates of the 
bank in question.140 
The key provision in § 13(c) creates an exception in the 
case of systemic risk. If various procedural hurdles are satis-
fied, and Treasury (in consultation with the President) deter-
mines that compliance with the least-cost requirements “would 
have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial 
 
 133. Id. at 19–20. 
 134. Id. at 19. 
 135. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Emergency Economic Stabili-
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stability,” then FDIC “may take other action or provide assis-
tance under this section . . . as necessary to avoid or mitigate 
such effects.”141 The italicized language is key. The most natu-
ral reading is that FDIC may (1) take other action under this 
section; or (2) provide assistance under this section. The FDIC 
can use only the powers it has under the section—to lend, to 
buy assets, to monitor, and so on—but it can use them, when 
systemic risk exists, to help banks and counterparties who 
would otherwise be denied help because they do not have FDIC 
insurance. 
FDIC’s position, as summarized by the GAO, is that when 
the systemic risk exception is triggered, FDIC’s power to “take 
other action or provide assistance under this section as neces-
sary to avoid or mitigate such effects” permits it to engage in 
any action—whether or not listed in the statute—as long as the 
action would mitigate systemic risk.142 FDIC reads the language 
to create two powers: “to take other action” of any type, and “to 
provide assistance under this section.” If systemic risk exists, 
FDIC may invoke its statutory powers (“provide assistance un-
der this section”) or—do anything. 
This is a stretch. The interpretation renders the phrase 
“provide assistance under this section” meaningless because it 
is fully encompassed by “other action.” The language “under 
this section” refers back to both “other action” and “provide as-
sistance,” confining the action/assistance powers to those that 
FDIC already possesses under the statute or closely related to 
them—the only purpose of the section being to eliminate the 
least-cost requirements when the entire banking system is at 
stake. FDIC’s interpretation converts FDIC into a general LLR 
that can rescue any company, not just a bank. However, Con-
gress saw FDIC as foremost a preserver of the deposit insur-
ance fund and supervisor of banks, and in 1991 added language 
to FDIC’s authorizing statute to encourage it to spend as little 
money rescuing banks as possible.143 If a systemic crisis occurs, 
FDIC may rescue a bank in the non-least-cost-way—for exam-
ple, by paying off creditors who are not covered by deposit in-
surance, or keeping a bank temporarily alive when it is insol-
vent—when nonpayment of creditors or the bank’s failure 
 
 141. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (emphasis added). 
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would threaten the system. By contrast, under the TLGP, FDIC 
offered insurance beyond the regular FDIC insurance program 
to banks that were not under threat of collapse and that were 
not determined to be systemically important, and to nonbanks 
as well.144 
FDIC also violated the law through its participation in the 
public-private investment program, an initiative from Treasury 
that enabled private entities and Treasury to jointly buy toxic 
loans and toxic securities from banks.145 FDIC facilitated this 
program by insuring the debt issued by Public-Private Invest-
ment Funds (PPIF), which were supplied by equity capital from 
Treasury and private investors. PPIFs would buy undervalued 
mortgages from banks, and either hold them to maturity or sell 
them after their prices recovered. The debt, secured by the 
mortgages, would be paid off first, with the balance going to the 
investors, as usual. FDIC relied on the systemic-risk trigger in 
its statute. Under its interpretation, the PPIF guarantees cer-
tainly qualified as “other actions,” and other actions that plau-
sibility mitigate systemic risk. Under the more plausible inter-
pretation of the statute, the PPIF guarantees were illegal be-
cause they were not issued to banks. They were issued to funds 
or trusts, which were effectively hedge funds, not depository 
institutions.146 
F. THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
Divisions among agencies prevented a unified response to 
the financial crisis to an extent that has not been appreciated. 
Before the crisis, two major agencies stood ready to provide 
emergency liquidity support: the Fed and FDIC. As we have 
seen, the Fed was authorized to make emergency secured loans, 
both to banks and non-banks.147 FDIC was authorized to make 
emergency loans to—and also to engage in other transactions 
with, like buying assets from—banks alone.148  In addition, 
FDIC’s authority was limited to addressing undercapitalized or 
 
 144. See id. at 50. 
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insolvent banks, while the Fed’s authority—at least, by cus-
tom—was limited to helping solvent institutions. 
Treasury had no standing rescue authority—putting aside 
the ESF, which was clearly not intended for financial-crisis res-
cue purposes. EESA placed $700 billion at the disposal of 
Treasury once the crisis began, funds that Treasury was au-
thorized to use to help any financial institution by buying as-
sets, making loans, and acquiring equity. Even after Treasury 
received these funds, the Fed and FDIC continued to play ex-
tremely important roles in the rescue, as we have seen. 
While all of the agencies were designed to play a role in 
rescuing the financial system, their roles—and hence their mis-
sions—differed. Sheila Bair, for example, saw her primary job 
as ensuring that the FDIC fund was not depleted, so that in-
sured depositors would be protected.149 Bernanke, Geithner, and 
Paulson believed that she put the fund’s solvency over the 
health of the financial system. Indeed, by insisting that the 
fund pay out only those with insurance, Bernanke and the oth-
ers believed that Bair was putting the fund at greater risk be-
cause if the shadow banking system collapsed, depositors would 
run on banks, destroying the FDIC fund. They tried to per-
suade her to make the FDIC guarantee more broadly available. 
Although Bair eventually agreed, authorizing FDIC’s participa-
tion in the TLGP and the PPIP, she did so only after delay and 
friction. 
Bernanke saw the Fed as the ultimate LLR, but he also de-
fined its role in narrower terms than he might have. The Fed 
traditionally earns financial returns through its operations, 
and every year turns over its “profits” (revenues minus operat-
ing expenses) to Treasury. As the financial crisis unfolded, 
Bernanke began to fear that those profits might be reduced to 
zero.150 He believed that if the Fed turned over no money to 
Treasury—or lost money—the political repercussions would be 
severe. This explains why Bernanke frequently interpreted 
§ 13(3) to mean that the Fed could lend only to solvent institu-
tions, while § 13(3) is not so limited; and why Bernanke on sev-
eral occasions obtained letters from Paulson that verified that a 
particular lending program might lose money.151 The letters 
 
 149. BAIR, supra note 66, at 2. 
 150. BERNANKE, supra note 70, at 204. 
 151. Id. at 205. 
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were not legally required, but would provide political cover in 
the case of a loss. Bernanke’s concerns help explain why he re-
fused to rescue Lehman—which he believed was insolvent—
and why he told Paulson that it would be necessary to go to 
Congress for additional money. 
Treasury is, by custom, the fiscal authority. With congres-
sional authorization, it spends the government’s money. That is 
why Paulson took the lead negotiating with Congress for EESA, 
and why EESA authorized spending through Treasury. And 
this is why Bernanke asked Paulson to write letters supporting 
several Fed programs that could have produced losses for 
Treasury. Treasury was allowed, through EESA, to make risky 
investments and buy risky assets, and thus was permitted to 
take losses. 
As a non-independent agency under the direct supervision 
of the President, Treasury is also a more “political” agency than 
the Fed and FDIC—that is, more sensitive to popular opinion 
as channeled through the Presidency than the Fed and FDIC, 
both of whose major concern is to retain their legitimacy with 
Congress. This, too, was reflected in Treasury’s actions. Paul-
son (and later Geithner) regularly consulted with the President 
and Congress. Paulson, stung by the negative reaction to the 
Bear rescue, and philosophically opposed to intervening in 
markets, was initially more cautious about bailouts than the 
Fed.152 Geithner, once in office, found himself under pressure 
from Congress and the President’s supporters to use TARP 
funds on foreclosure relief, despite his doubts about its effec-
tiveness.153 By contrast, the Fed and FDIC showed little inter-
est in this issue.154 
While the Fed, Treasury, and FDIC were the main players, 
they needed to contend with numerous other agencies with au-
thority over other pieces of the financial system. The Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) were the primary regulators of the national 
banks and the federal S&Ls. These agencies lacked LLR au-
thority but nonetheless tried to protect the institutions they 
regulated from shut-downs, and in general acted as nuisances. 
 
 152. See supra notes 104–05. 
 153. GEITHNER, supra note 86, at 209–10. 
 154. In her memoir, Bair expressed concern about homeowners, but there 
was little that the FDIC could do for them. BAIR, supra note 66, at 49–53, 128. 
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The SEC used its emergency powers to implement a temporary 
short-sale ban—apparently, at the behest of the Fed and 
Treasury—and otherwise did little of value.155  The Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) operated the conservatorships 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; Geithner would later complain 
that it obstructed efforts to revive the mortgage market.156 
She feared that Citigroup would choke on Wachovia, expos-
ing FDIC’s insurance fund to massive liabilities. Geithner was 
infuriated by Bair’s stance.157 He believed that the government’s 
credibility was at stake, but the real source of disagreement 
appears to be that Geithner wanted to help Citigroup, which 
would have benefited from Wachovia’s deposit base.158 
This episode can be read in two ways: as a good-faith disa-
greement about the proper crisis response, and as a clash be-
tween bureaucratic missions. Under the former interpretation, 
the agencies disagreed about timing and tactics: whether to 
provide assistance to Citigroup by favoring it over Wells Fargo, 
even though Wells Fargo offered the better deal, or to provide 
assistance to Citigroup later through a direct infusion of funds 
(as happened). Bair believed that the latter approach was more 
transparent and fair, while Geithner believed that the press of 
events did not allow for it. As a bureaucratic clash, the dispute 
can be seen as one in which each agency favored its turf. FDIC 
sought to preserve the bank insurance fund; Geithner sought to 
protect a major bank with which the FRBNY had a close rela-
tionship. 
Another dispute occurred over Lehman. Among the princi-
pals, Geithner was the most anxious to save Lehman—and, in 
general, the most aggressive about bailing out firms. Paulson 
was most reluctant. Bernanke was in the middle. An explana-
tion for this division was that Paulson was the most politically 
accountable—and the public mood at that time was decisively 
 
 155. The SEC was also asked to relax mark-to-market accounting stand-
ards but refrained from doing so, instead issuing an ambiguously worded 
statement recognizing that those standards allow firms to abandon marks 
during liquidity crises. See generally Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did 
Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the Financial Crisis?, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 
93 (2010). 
 156. GEITHNER, supra note 86, at 174–76; see also W. Scott Frame et al., 
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 47–49 
(2015). 
 157. GEITHNER, supra note 86, at 217. 
 158. See BAIR, supra note 66, at 88; GEITHNER, supra note 86, at 217–19. 
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opposed to bailouts. Bernanke also worried about the public’s 
and Congress’s suspicion of the Fed and sought to avoid a 
transaction in which the Fed lost money. Geithner, while also a 
Fed employee, was not as central a figure and was freer to act 
on his judgment as to what was best for the financial system. 
All that said, the initial reactions to the bailouts showed 
more consensus than disagreement among the three LLR agen-
cies. This probably reflected their relative political insulation. 
Even Paulson was protected by Bush’s lame duck status. By 
contrast, Congress could not avoid politics. Members of Con-
gress, unlike President Bush, faced reelection campaigns in 
November 2008. By the time of EESA, much of the public had 
come around to bailouts, but intense dissent remained, and 
EESA was initially voted down in the House.159 It was eventual-
ly passed only after $150 billion of pork had been added to the 
Senate version of the bill.160 The many payoffs—such as the re-
peal of an excise tax on toy arrows161—were transparent inter-
est-group transfers that were unrelated to the policy questions 
raised by the law. The substantive provisions of EESA reflected 
the influence of the finance industry. Mian et al. find a statisti-
cally significant correlation between campaign contributions 
from Wall Street and an elected official’s vote in favor of 
EESA.162 
After EESA was enacted, politically connected firms—
defined in various ways, including firms with directors who 
worked for a banking regulator or Treasury—were more likely 
to receive TARP funds than other firms.163 There is also evi-
dence that investors in firms with political connections to 
Geithner expected those firms to benefit when Geithner was 
appointed Treasury Secretary.164 
 
 159. PAULSON, supra note 98, at 319–20. 
 160. See Atif Mian et al., The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage De-
fault Crisis, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1967, 1972 (2010) (“The bill also included up 
to $150 billion of unrelated tax breaks for individuals and businesses . . . .”). 
 161. Breakdown of the Final Bailout Bill, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/ 
AR2008092800900.html. 
 162. Mian et al., supra note 20, at 18; see also Michael Dorsch, Bailout for 
Sale? The Vote To Save Wall Street, 155 PUB. CHOICE 211 (2013). 
 163. See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, The Politics of Government Invest-
ment, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 24 (2012). 
 164. Daron Acemoglu et al., The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: 
Evidence from the United States, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 368, 368 (2016) 
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The political economy of the crisis response is too complex 
to allow for simple conclusions and requires more study. But 
this much seems to be clear: Congress was more responsive to 
public opinion than the agencies, and Treasury was more re-
sponsive to public opinion than the Fed and FDIC. Congress 
had a less sophisticated understanding of the crisis, and Con-
gress, as always, was both slower and more transparent than 
the agencies. But the influence of interest-group pressures is 
difficult to untangle: was Congress more heavily influenced by 
them than the agencies were, or not? A tentative view is that 
the agencies reacted more quickly and more as technocratic ex-
perts than Congress did, but they were also influenced by nar-
row bureaucratic missions as well as complex interest-group 
pressures. 
G. CONCLUSION: GAPS IN THE RESCUE AGENCIES’ AUTHORITY 
The crisis response was hampered by gaps in the govern-
ment’s powers. While EESA closed some of these gaps, the in-
volvement of Congress in the midst of a crisis created problems 
of its own. There was not enough time for members of Congress 
to educate themselves about the crisis and to deliberate about 
it. Election-year politics also interfered with deliberation. Ex-
perts outside the government, whose testimony would have 
normally been sought, were excluded from participation by 
Democrats who, according to a pair of authors, wanted to en-
sure that the public would associate the crisis response with 
the Bush administration.165 Congress was little more than a 
rubber stamp. 
In sum, the agencies were hampered by their lack of au-
thority to: 
 
(“[F]inancial firms with a connection to Geithner experienced a cumulative 
abnormal return—relative to other financial sector firms—of about 6%.”). 
 165. See Calomiris & Khan, supra note 111, at 72 (“[Democrats] did not 
want independent testimony to put them ‘on the spot.’ They did not want to 
have to create or politically ‘own’ new ideas about assisting banks. The path of 
least political resistance was to let Secretary Paulson take the lead and the 
responsibility.”). 
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 Buy assets, including equity;166 
 Make unsecured loans to non-bank financial institutions; 
 Control non-bank financial institutions to which the Fed 
made loans, in order to force them to pay off counterpar-
ties, lend money, and so on; 
 Wind up insolvent non-bank financial institutions, in-
cluding the lack of authority to lend to them or counter-
parties in order to ensure an orderly liquidation; 
 Force non-bank financial institutions to raise capital; 
and 
 Dictate terms of transactions, control the behavior of 
firms (for example, forcing them to lend), or acquire 
them where necessary. 
In the absence of these authorities, the agencies impro-
vised, but in ways that were far from ideal. First, the agencies 
used veiled threats to force financial institutions to act in need-
ed ways. Second, the agencies “regulated by deal”167—effectively 
bribing financial institutions to act as desired. As an illustra-
tion of both these points, in order to persuade banks to partici-
pate in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), Treasury offered 
favorable terms and issued a veiled threat that things would go 
poorly for banks that did not participate.168 Third, the agencies, 
in a number of instances, simply violated the law—as the Fed 
did when it acquired equity in AIG and controlled its opera-
tions. Fourth, the agencies ultimately demanded a law from 
Congress, which caused delay and numerous other problems. 
Further exacerbating all these problems, the major agencies—
Treasury, the Fed, and FDIC—failed to coordinate on a number 
of occasions because of conflicting bureaucratic missions as well 
as good-faith disagreements. 
 
 166. Often called the “market-maker of last resort” function. See, e.g., Paul 
Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles 
and Reconstruction 28–32 (Bank for Int’l Settlement, Paper No. 79, 2014). For 
an overview of the debate, see Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last 
Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (2012). For a model in which a central 
bank can address a liquidity shock by purchasing equity, in this way improv-
ing liquidity, see Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Liquidity, Business Cycles, 
and Monetary Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17934, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17934.pdf. 
 167. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Govern-
ment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009). 
 168. See WESSEL, supra note 31, at 237–40. 
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III.  REFORM   
A. SUBSTANTIVE AUTHORITIES 
When a tornado, hurricane, or earthquake strikes, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sends per-
sonnel, resources, and money to the affected area, while the 
police or national guard uses emergency authority to keep or-
der. The government is not required to ask Congress for assis-
tance; legal authority to respond to the emergency in all ways 
necessary is already in place. This simple model should guide 
the design of what I will call the Financial Crisis Response Au-
thority (FCRA). 
The FCRA, because of its vast powers, should be permitted 
to act only after a financial crisis has begun. The law should, as 
now, provide that the FCRA’s authorities are triggered upon 
agreement by a supermajority of top economic officials, includ-
ing the President. These officials should also release a state-
ment that describes objective indicators of crisis, such as a col-
lapse of lending or other signs of loss of confidence. 
Once the crisis begins, the FCRA would be able to draw on 
an unlimited credit line from Treasury or on a fund supplied 
from taxes on all financial institutions, or (best of all) both.169 
An unlimited credit line would follow the model of the Fed, 
which can extend credit on its own account, enabling the FCRA 
to borrow enough money to fund its rescue activities, whatever 
magnitude the crisis. A fund would follow the model of the 
FDIC, which relies on a fund financed by assessments from 
banks with FDIC insurance. Each approach has different ad-
vantages. The problem with a fund is that it could run out of 
money before the crisis has been resolved. Congress would need 
to replenish it, creating the risk of delay or failure to act, which 
would greatly worsen the crisis. In contrast, the FCRA could 
draw on an unlimited credit line indefinitely. 
However, a fund might be more politically appealing be-
cause it is self-financing. When financial institutions receive 
payouts from a fund financed by their own assessments, there 
is no sense in which they are being “bailed out” by the taxpay-
 
 169. Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher Muller persuasively make the case for 
such a fund. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Finan-
cial Crisis; Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency In-
surance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151 (2011). 
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er. This is a particular advantage if firms are insolvent, and not 
merely illiquid. During the crisis, the FDIC took much less po-
litical heat than the Fed, probably for this reason. A good case 
could be made for a limited fund, which could be supplemented 
by lending authority, and perhaps a requirement that the Fed 
seek approval from Congress as well. 
However it is funded, the FCRA could use its resources to 
buy financial assets, including notes, loans, bonds, and stock; to 
make secured and unsecured loans; to purchase and take con-
trol of financial institutions; and to seize financial institutions 
under the power of eminent domain with just compensation 
determined by a judicial valuation at a later date. The FCRA 
would also enjoy a separate regulatory or supervisory power, 
which would enable it to order financial institutions to raise 
capital, to shut down operations, to sell assets, and to borrow 
money; it would also be given the power to ban or regulate 
market transactions, like short sales.170 
The recent financial crisis shows why all these powers are 
necessary and the conventional Bagehot approach is inade-
quate. Because of the fear of stigma, even liquidity-constrained 
financial institutions will be inclined to delay before borrowing 
from emergency credit facilities. The FCRA needs the authority 
to force those firms to borrow, and also to force healthy firms to 
borrow at the same time in order to prevent the market from 
picking off the weakest firm. Moreover, the crisis showed that 
when financial institutions accept emergency loans, they have 
strong incentives to hoard cash, when the system as a whole 
benefits only if they lend into the market a portion of the mon-
ey they borrow. For this reason, the FCRA needs the authority 
to order firms to enter financial transactions. Finally, the crisis 
showed that financial institutions that should be given emer-
gency money may not be able to offer collateral for a loan, and 
it may be very difficult to value the collateral in any event. The 
FCRA needs the authority to make capital injections, issue un-
secured and partially secured loans, and buy assets. 
 
 170. During the financial crisis, the SEC, apparently under pressure from 
the Fed, briefly banned short sales on financial stocks. At the time, some ana-
lysts believed that short-selling artificially suppressed the equity value of 
banks, creating concerns about their insolvency that could create a downward 
spiral. The academic consensus, however, is that bans on short sales, here and 
abroad, caused harm. See, e.g., Ekkehart Boehmer et al., Shackling Short 
Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1363 (2013). 
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Vast powers create opportunities for abuse; the FCRA can-
not be given unlimited power. Judicial review during a crisis is 
impractical, as the 2007–08 crisis showed. People negatively 
affected by the government’s actions could not persuade courts 
to intervene.171 Judges are unwilling to interfere with emergen-
cy actions by expert agencies. Courts move too slowly and lack 
expertise. One court denied relief even after the crisis, explain-
ing that if it did award damages to the claimants, then gov-
ernment officials would refuse to take justified risks during the 
next crisis.172 However, this view, if taken to its logical extreme, 
would eliminate any constraint on the government. A robust 
legal regime to correct abuses after the crisis can be put into 
place. As noted, where the FCRA uses force to acquire firms 
and other assets, the owners will be able to sue the government 
for damages based on a proper valuation that uses fundamental 
rather than crisis-driven asset values. In addition, where the 
FCRA uses it regulatory and supervisory authorities to order 
firms to shed assets and make loans, the firms will be entitled 
to sue after the crisis and receive a remedy if they can show 
that the FCRA’s actions were unreasonable. The usual post-
crisis analyses by independent government agencies with the 
power to compel testimony and discover documents from the 
FCRA will facilitate the litigation by collecting facts and mak-
ing them publicly available. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 
The complex division of responsibility between financial 
regulatory agencies hampered the crisis response. How should 
the FCRA be designed to do better? It is tempting to argue that 
all powers should be handed to it, eliminating at a stroke the 
problem of interagency rivalries. However, it is doubtful that 
such a powerful agency would be politically acceptable, while 
existing agencies are too deeply entrenched in the government’s 
institutional structure to be swept aside. The Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 171. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases 
from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Com-
ity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 714–15 (2009). 
 172. Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 247 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (referencing “distinct areas of doctrine” in which “tort liability 
for governmental actors is narrowly limited or precluded altogether, in order 
to give such actors the latitude and discretion to do their jobs effectively, in-
cluding when circumstances are pressing and there is limited time to act”). 
Disclosure: I worked on this case for the plaintiffs. 
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eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision, but addressed the 
entrenched status of the other agencies by layering a coordinat-
ing body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 
above them.173 The FSOC identifies risks in the financial sys-
tem, identifies systemically risky institutions, and orders the 
breakup of too-big-to-fail entities, but it does not enjoy any res-
cue authority aside from a coordinating function. 
This seems inadequate, but it is not clear what the alterna-
tive is. The problem with the existing regulatory structure, re-
vealed by the financial crisis, is that the different agencies de-
velop constituencies that they try to protect: for the OCC, big 
New York banks; for the OTS, thrifts; for FDIC, regular banks; 
for the Fed, big Wall Street financial institutions. FEMA or the 
National Guard do not favor constituencies, but rather see their 
mission as protecting people and restoring order.174 It is possi-
ble to think that a financial agency could be given a similar 
purely ex post mission, detached from ex ante regulatory re-
sponsibilities that might cause it to favor some entities over 
others. But the connection between ex ante regulation and ex 
post response seems necessary to ensure that agencies possess 
enough information and expertise about the financial system to 
be able to act wisely during a crisis. 
If we use history as our guide, the Fed seems to be the 
agency that shows the least favoritism and the most considera-
tion for the general public rather than for specific groups. Be-
cause of their power over the money supply, central banks are 
in a better position than other agencies to address a financial 
crisis. This role has been understood for a long time and is cen-
tral to the mission and self-conception of central banks. The 
Fed already has the broadest powers and the greatest level of 
sophistication among all the financial agencies. While practical 
and institutional constraints cannot be wished away, Congress 
should gradually transfer additional powers to the Fed—such 
as the power to buy assets, make unsecured loans, and acquire 
 
 173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 174. This is not to say that these institutions perform blamelessly. FEMA, 
in particular, has been subject to criticism for decades, and has been reor-
ganized numerous times. See HENRY B. HOGUE & KEITH BEA, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL33369, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY ORGANIZATION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE OP-
TIONS (2006). 
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equity—while removing LLR powers from other agencies, to the 
extent politically feasible. 
C. DODD-FRANK 
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created a much-needed 
resolution authority for non-bank financial firms. It named it 
the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) and placed it under 
the control of FDIC.175 But Congress perversely reduced the 
power of the LLR in three ways. First, it amended § 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act to require that emergency loans take place 
through a “program or facility with broad-based eligibility.”176 
This provision was intended to ban bailouts similar to those of 
Bear and AIG, which were directed to a single company rather 
than a group of companies. By contrast, the many credit facili-
ties were open to any company that satisfied certain criteria. 
Facilities like those would remain lawful under the amend-
ment. 
Second, Congress blocked Treasury from using the Ex-
change Stabilization Fund to finance “any future guaranty pro-
grams for the United States money market mutual fund indus-
try.”177 This was intended to prevent a repeat of the Temporary 
Guarantee Program, which helped end the run of money mar-
ket mutual funds. 
Third, Congress put constraints on FDIC’s power to offer 
system-wide guarantees, mainly by erecting procedural hurdles 
and stipulating that the guarantee cannot benefit insolvent in-
stitutions.178 Congress was apparently reacting to FDIC’s Tem-
porary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which, as we saw, may 
have violated FDIC’s legal authority. 
By placing additional restrictions on the Fed and the other 
agencies and placing the OLA outside the Fed, Congress weak-
ened the power of the government to address a financial cri-
sis.179 How much it weakened the government is hard to say. If 
 
 175. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2012). 
 176. See id. § 343. In 2015, the Fed adopted regulations implementing the 
law. See David Harrison, Fed Adopts Dodd-Frank Bailout Limits, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-set-to-adopt-final-emergency 
-lending-rule-1448889633. 
 177. 12 U.S.C. § 5236(b) (2012). 
 178. Id. §§ 5611–5612. 
 179. Interestingly, there is some evidence that the customized rescues cre-
ated moral hazard while the non-customized forms of liquidity support did not. 
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the last crisis is a guide, agencies will be able to coordinate in 
the major crisis response, and they will read the new re-
strictions narrowly in order to evade them. But Congress 
missed an opportunity to provide necessary additional authori-
ty to the LLR and reduce its coordination costs. 
  CONCLUSION   
The financial crisis exposed significant gaps in the LLR’s 
authority. While Congress filled one gap with the OLA, it per-
versely widened the others. It should have enhanced the pow-
ers of the LLR and gathered as many of those powers as possi-
ble into the hands of the Fed, subject to a strong procedural 
trigger that requires consensus among top economic officials 
and the President that a financial crisis has begun. The reason 
is simple. The LLR powers available to the Fed and other agen-
cies reflected a simpler world in which the banking system was 
the primary source of short-term liabilities, so that the FDIC 
fund plus the Fed’s residual lending powers sufficed to stop a 
crisis, even to prevent a crisis from starting. A new system that 
extends the LLR to the shadow banking system is needed. 
Congress did not create such an LLR for numerous—
mostly political—reasons, including distrust of the Fed and 
popular resentment at the bailouts of Wall Street firms. The 
most important policy reason for restricting the LLR is the the-
ory that a generous LLR encourages financial institutions to 
behave recklessly—a theory that was adopted in Dodd-Frank 
itself.180 Economists disagree about whether moral hazard is a 
significant concern, and I will not address this topic here.181 The 
minimal point is that moral hazard is not a justification for de-
priving the LLR of the powers that it needs to rescue the finan-
cial system. The necessity of an LLR is (within mainstream 
economic and political circles) uncontested. And if an LLR is 
necessary, then it should be supplied with the powers that it 
needs to function. Moral hazard justifies ex ante regulation 
 
See Yacine Aït-Sahalia et al., Market Response to Policy Initiatives During the 
Global Financial Crisis, 87 J. INT’L ECON. 162, 176 (2012). However, it does 
not seem to me that the evidence is strong enough to justify depriving the Fed 
of this power. 
 180. The preamble claims that the Dodd-Frank Act will end bailouts. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
 181. See supra note 35. 
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such as capital requirements, which are independent of the 
LLR’s power, and (conceivably) requirements that the LLR pe-
nalize the firms that it rescues—for example, with high interest 
rates, as in the original Bagehot formulation. Both ex ante reg-
ulation and ex post penalizing are consistent with a powerful 
and robust LLR. 
As an analogy, imagine that a town is plagued by residen-
tial fires, caused by the carelessness of homeowners who do not 
install smoke detectors and store flammable materials in their 
basements. The town could sensibly address this problem by 
enacting a fire code that it enforces with inspections. It could 
also address this problem by directing the fire department to 
replace hoses with squirt guns and tanker trucks with horse-
drawn carriages. The second approach would certainly address 
moral hazard; residents, fearful that the fire department will 
not save their houses, would be more careful. But not all fires 
are caused by carelessness, and not all careless fires should be 
allowed to burn, since, by a process similar to financial conta-
gion, fires may spread from house to house. The town does bet-
ter with the fire code along with a modern fire department. And 
so with the LLR. 
Expanding the power of the LLR is urgent because every 
financial crisis is different; the next one may not look like the 
last. Reacting to the most recent financial crisis, regulators to-
day focus on mortgage underwriting, the repo market, and too-
big-to-fail institutions. But a crisis could emerge in the student 
debt market, margin lending used for equity purchases if the 
stock market collapses, clearinghouses, or anywhere else. It 
could spread through small institutions rather than big ones. It 
is in the nature of financial systems that money will flee more 
highly regulated areas and seek out assets and transactions 
that regulators overlook or leave alone. To fight the next war 
rather than the last one, the LLR needs very broad authority, 
essentially over the entire financial system. 
Numerous scholars have argued that the Fed and Treasury 
violated the rule of law during the financial crisis, and many of 
them also argue that the Fed needs to be stripped of powers so 
that it cannot violate the rule of law again.182 On inspection, it 
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becomes clear that while the authors believe (in most cases, 
correctly) that the Fed violated the law during the crisis, their 
main complaint is that Congress has given the Fed too much 
discretionary power, which enables it to act arbitrarily. Howev-
er, the constitutional limitations on delegation of power to 
agencies—embodied in the “nondelegation doctrine”—are effec-
tively nil. The requirement that the LLR use its powers to un-
freeze the financial system183 would supply the intelligible prin-
ciple required by the “nondelegation doctrine” under recent 
precedents.184 
A more serious version of this criticism, emphasized by 
Paul Tucker, is that, as a matter of political economy (as op-
posed to legal principles), an unconstrained central bank is 
both undesirable and unsustainable.185 Undesirable because we 
live in a democracy, and an independent agency with vast pow-
ers may act against the will of the people; and unsustainable 
because for just that reason, the agency will be regarded with 
suspicion and ultimately subject to constraints.186 Tucker advo-
cates two types of constraints: procedural and substantive. The 
procedural constraints include reporting requirements, trigger-
ing rules that require the agreement of top officials, and the 
like. Few people would disagree with such requirements, which 
are mostly in place. As a substantive constraint, he argues that 
the LLR should never be allowed to lend to insolvent firms be-
cause such loans put at risk funds that go to Treasury, and 
hence they raise “fiscal” issues that are the province of Con-
gress and the people. 
Tucker’s worries are well grounded. The restrictions on the 
LLR in the Dodd-Frank Act, along with routine threats by Con-
gress to impose further restrictions on the Fed, reflect just 
those worries. The problem with his argument is that, as we 
saw during the financial crisis, lending to insolvent firms—or 
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firms that are likely to be insolvent—may well be a sensible 
approach to a crisis. Many such firms often have counterparties 
that are solvent, and lending to insolvent firms, enabling them 
to pay their counterparties, may be a more efficient way of 
helping the counterparties than lending to them directly. 
While the idea that the LLR should not invade the fiscal 
province of the legislature has a long history, going back to 
Bagehot and beyond, it is time to retire it. The fiscal-versus-
monetary distinction is illusory during a financial crisis. The 
LLR can value most collateral only with difficulty, with the 
valuation depending on whether or not the crisis conditions will 
ameliorate in the near future. As a result, the LLR’s collateral 
valuations are based in part on the LLR’s own prediction about 
the effectiveness of its current and future actions, giving it a 
huge amount of effective discretion even under the strict Bage-
hot approach. Moreover, if the LLR acts weakly rather than 
aggressively, and fails to resolve the crisis, the negative fiscal 
consequences—lower tax receipts, higher transfer payments—
would vastly exceed losses on loans made to insolvent firms. 
And if the question is popular legitimacy, the fiscal-versus-
monetary distinction will be lost on the public. 
The LLR will be able to survive in a democracy, regardless 
of how powerful and independent it is, as long as the public be-
lieves that it serves the public interest. Depriving it of the pow-
ers it needs will not advance that goal. 
